The Delusions of Davos and Dubai, vs. Realistic Pathways to Global Energy Security
Contents
Wind and solar energy cannot be relied on as the primary means to lift all of humanity into prosperity. But earlier this year, as an impressive fleet of private jets migrated from the COP 28 Summit in Dubai to the World Economic Forum in Davos, carrying the hoi polloi of the world from one elitist summit to another, this delusion was the dominant sentiment. In this analysis, what can accurately be described as a collective, perhaps willful delusion will be exposed in excruciating detail. It will be dry and tedious reading. And perhaps that’s why journalists, activists, bureaucrats, and politicians have accepted the delusion. So buckle up. Here’s the other side of the story.
An article published in the New York Post shortly after the war in Ukraine began in early 2022 nicely encapsulated what might be described as the “energy realist” perspective in the ongoing debate over climate and energy. In his article entitled “If the Ukraine war hasn’t scared the West straight on energy, nothing will,” author Rich Lowry reminded us, “The world hasn’t embraced fossil fuels out of hatred of the planet but because they are so incredibly useful.”
Even if some claim there is only an alleged consensus on the potentially catastrophic threat represented by fossil fuels, there is widespread agreement on the direct connection between energy and prosperity. With that in mind, and to make clear how critical it is to produce more energy worldwide, much more, here’s an immutable fact, based on data reported in the 2023 edition of the Energy Institute’s Statistical Review of World Energy: For everyone on earth to have access to half the energy per capita that Americans consume, global energy production will have to double.
To be precise, since this is a statistic that carries huge implications, in 2022, according to the World Bank, total world population was 7.954 billion. In 2022, according to the Energy Institute, total world energy consumption was 604.0 exajoules. In that same year, there were 333.3 million Americans, consuming a total of 95.9 exajoules. That means that in 2022, the average American consumed 288 gigajoules, while the other 7.62 billion people in the world consumed, per capita, a mere 67 gigajoules.
This is not difficult math. It isn’t necessary to understand that a billion gigajoules equals an exajoule, or that most energy economists now convert all forms of measurable energy use—coal, gas, oil, solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, biofuel, hydro, and nuclear—into joules to have a common unit for analysis. It is only necessary to know that these units and conversion ratios adhere to well-established, credible methodologies that are accepted worldwide and that 288 gigajoules, which the average American consumed in 2022, is more than four times as much energy as what people in the rest of the world consumed in 2022, 67 gigajoules.
In further pursuit of precision, and to let this sink in, consider the exact amount by which global energy production would have to increase based on various estimates of the levels at which the global population will peak. If the world population had stayed at 2022 levels, and if everyone (including Americans) consumed half as much energy per capita as Americans consumed in that year, global energy production would have to increase by 89 percent. That is, it would only have to nearly double. But the global population continues to increase.
As of January 2024, the global population is already estimated at 8.1 billion, and despite dwindling birth rates everywhere on earth except in Africa, parts of the Middle East, and Central America, the United Nations currently projects the global population to peak at 11.2 billion before the end of this century.
Again, the math is not difficult. If the global population reaches 9 billion, as it almost certainly will, for everyone on earth (including Americans) to use half as much energy as Americans did in 2022, global energy production would have to increase by 114 percent—more than doubling. At a global population of 10 billion, under these same constraints, energy production would have to increase by 138 percent over 2022 levels.
How Will Global Energy Production Double?
There is some good news in all this. Because the first question anyone still willing to wade through these numbers ought to ask is: How on earth will Americans, or anyone else for that matter, enjoy a so-called First World quality of life if they only have access to half as much energy as they currently use? The answer to this question lies in the distinction between energy inputs and energy services, which constitutes the strongest case for electrifying the economy.
The following flowchart from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory provides an intuitive visualization of the difference between energy inputs and energy services. The most recent available chart is dated 2011, when total world energy flow (please don’t be alarmed, the units used on this chart are petajoules, abbreviated as PJ. Every 1,000 petajoules is equal to one exajoule) was estimated at 534 exajoules. But those 534 exajoules were energy inputs, depicted on the left side of the flowchart, not energy services, which are depicted on the right side of the flowchart.
Apart from the fact that these datasets reveal total global energy production between 2011 and 2022 to have only increased by 13 percent in over a decade, which is not an encouraging rate of growth if our objective is to double global energy production, the critical variables to examine on this flowchart are how, despite inputting 534 exajoules worth of mostly coal, petroleum, and natural gas fuel, 290 exajoules of that was “rejected energy,” and only 210 exajoules were actual “energy services.”
What this means is that only 40 percent of the energy we burned, boiled, generated, or otherwise extracted from natural sources was ultimately enjoyed as heating and cooling in our homes and businesses, traction for our cars and trucks, propulsion for our airplanes, electricity for our appliances, computers, communications, media, and so on. The rest was lost to heat and friction.
The technological state of the global energy economy today is such that 60 percent of the energy we put into the system is lost. More recent corroboration of this assumption comes from the 2023 edition of the Statistical Review of Global Energy, where in the appendix they state their energy conversion efficiency assumptions as follows: “2000-2017: a linear increase from 36% to 40%… the assumption [is] that efficiency will increase linearly to 45% by 2050.”
Using new energy technologies to greatly improve conversion efficiency spells an opportunity with world-changing potential. If we could lift our efficiency from 40 to 80 percent, then in order to enjoy the same level of energy services we currently consume, we would only have to supply a raw energy input of 25 percent in excess of what we intend to consume in services, instead of the current 60 percent.
Expressed in actual units of energy, that means that in 2022, at 40 percent efficiency, the 604 exajoules of raw energy input into the economy yielded energy services of 242 exajoules. If the devices we use to convert energy inputs into energy services were to double to a conversion efficiency of 80 percent, everyone in the world would already have access to twice as much usable energy.
The technologies that are purported to have this potential include EVs and batteries, which can convert electricity into traction, including the charge/discharge cycle of the battery and taking into account regenerative braking, at around 80 percent, whereas it is rare for any vehicle with an internal combustion engine to achieve better than 40 percent efficiency. Similarly, electrification proponents claim the latest heat-pump technology utilizes electricity for space heating far more efficiently than natural gas heaters.
While there is ongoing debate over just how much efficiency is gained by moving from an energy economy based primarily on fossil fuel combustion to one based primarily on electricity, it is clear that the efficiency of many energy services can be greatly improved by going electric. The promise of extraordinary gains in energy efficiency is the reason it may be realistic to set a total world energy production target at around 1,000 exajoules, which is not quite double the currently estimated 604 exajoules set in 2022. The next chart shows how this works out numerically.
There are huge assumptions in this chart. All of them error in the direction of potentially underestimating how much total global energy may be adequate to lift all of humanity into prosperity. The global population may exceed 10 billion. Retooling the entire energy economy of the world to achieve 80 percent efficiency between raw inputs and end-user energy services would be an extraordinary achievement. And even if we did succeed in deploying new technologies everywhere in order to harvest 80 percent of our raw energy input in the form of end-user energy services, it is extremely unlikely we could do this without using coal, oil, and gas.
Increasing global energy production to 1,000 exajoules from the current 604 in just 26 years is a Herculean task, arguably impossible without resorting to an all-of-the-above energy development strategy. Part two will present the current global fuel mix and, using the guidelines agreed upon at the recent COP 28 summit in Dubai, present their proposed future global fuel mix. These calculations will demonstrate that the amount of wind and solar expansion necessary to adhere to COP 28 guidelines while still producing the minimum total energy worldwide is far greater than is generally understood or acknowledged.
More to the point, the calculations in the next installment will demonstrate the absolute absurdity of pretending that reliance on wind and solar energy is a viable strategy. The reader may then determine if the catastrophic consequences of adhering to an energy strategy that is an obvious failure might merit a more forceful repudiation of the entire “net zero” agenda. Adaptation, not “net zero,” is the only rational response to whatever theories of climate may remain in vogue.
Can Wind & Solar Energy Expand 50-100 Times?
In the most recent “Conference of the Parties,” otherwise known as the United Nations extravaganza that convenes every few years for world leaders to discuss the climate crisis, several goals were publicly proclaimed. Notable were the goals to triple production of renewable energy by 2030 and triple production of nuclear energy by 2050. Against the backdrop of current global energy production by fuel type, and as quantified in Part One, against a goal of increasing total energy production from 600 exajoules in 2022 to at least 1,000 exajoules by 2050, where does COP 28’s goals put the world’s energy economy? How much will production of renewable energy have to increase?
To answer this question, it is necessary to recognize and account for the fact that most renewable energy takes the form of electricity, generated through wind, solar, or geothermal sources. And when measuring how much the base of renewables installed so far will contribute to the target of 1,000 exajoules of energy production per year in order to realize—best-case scenario—800 exajoules of energy services, the data reported in the Statistical Review of Global Energy is profoundly misleading.
Without understanding how current renewables data as reported in summary charts can mislead an analyst into overstating its current contribution to global energy, it is impossible to accurately assess the true magnitude of the expansion in renewables needed to achieve a goal of 1,000 exajoules of global energy production per year. How the summary charts mislead is buried in the Appendix.
As the authors disclose (ref. page 56, “Methodology”) in the Appendix: “in the Statistical Review of World Energy, the primary energy of non-fossil based electricity (nuclear, hydro, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass in power and other renewables sources) has been calculated on an ‘input-equivalent’ basis – i.e. based on the equivalent amount of fossil fuel input required to generate that amount of electricity in a standard thermal power plant.”
It is difficult to overstate how important it is to not overlook this seemingly innocuous footnote.
In plain English, what they are saying is when they report (ref. page 9 “Primary Energy: Consumption by fuel”) the share of global energy contributed by all non-thermal sources—hydro, nuclear, wind, and solar—they gross up the lower, actual production number and report on the chart an imputed and much larger amount, calculated as if these four sources of energy were operating at the efficiency of thermal power inputs, i.e., at 40 percent efficiency.
Why? We may presume that the energy analysts preparing these charts gross up the contribution of non-thermal energy (Lawrence Livermore also does this, by the way, on their energy flowchart) in order to demonstrate how much fossil fuel production is being offset by using non-thermal sources. That seems innocent enough. But it’s misleading.
If we’re setting a goal of 1,000 exajoules of ultimate world energy production and assuming 80 percent of that 1,000 exajoules of energy input shall be realized as end-user energy services, then we have to examine how much usable energy wind, solar, hydro, and nuclear are actually being generated today. That means we need to know how much electricity they actually generate and send into the grid. An imputed, grossed-up number is not helpful.
Getting to 1,000 Exajoules per Year without Coal, Oil, and Gas
Fortunately, the actual amount of power currently generated by hydro, nuclear, wind, and solar can be found in the inner chapters of the Statistical Review. But it is important to recognize that if energy production shifts from thermal sources to electricity, it will still take at least 1,000 exajoules of power generation to produce 800 exajoules of energy services.
It must be again emphasized that it is an extraordinary assumption to project an 80 percent retention of energy from input into the grid to actual end use. For example, we might assume that from the generating plant, 5 percent was lost in transmission, another 5 percent lost from charging and subsequently discharging the electricity to and from utility-scale storage batteries, another 5 percent in the charge/discharge cycle through an onboard battery in an EV, and another 5 percent converting that electricity into traction from the electric motor. Those are extraordinarily optimistic numbers, using a best-case example. Is a heat pump that efficient, or an air conditioner, or a cooktop, or any number of appliances, farm machinery, industrial equipment, and other vital infrastructure? Definitely not yet, and quite possibly never.
The point here is 1,000 exajoules represents the absolute minimum to which global energy production must grow in the next 25 years if every person on earth is to have access to enough energy to enable prosperity and security. How do we get there? Let’s take the experts at their word and assume that use of coal, oil, and gas will be completely eliminated by 2050.
On the chart below, the assumptions governing the future mix of fuels worldwide adhere to the resolutions just made at the recent Conference of the Parties. That is, nuclear energy will be tripled, and use of oil, natural gas, and coal will be eliminated. To take some of the pressure off of the required expansion of solar and wind energy, for this analysis, the sacrilegious assumption is made to double hydroelectric capacity, double geothermal production, and double biofuel production. It won’t matter much. Here goes:
There’s a lot to chew on in this data, but it’s worth the effort. Because the facts they present are immutable and carry with them significant implications for global energy policy. The first column of data shows how much fuel was burned or generated worldwide in 2022—the raw fuel inputs, which total 604 exajoules.
The second column of data shows the number of energy services that reached end-users in 2022 in the form of heating, cooling, traction, light, communications, etc. It is clear that for thermal sources of energy, the lower numbers reflect the currently estimated degree of conversion efficiency worldwide, about 40 percent. But for non-thermal sources of energy (appended to the right with “gen,” signifying generated energy), these numbers are based on terawatt-hour reports featured in individual sections of the Statistical Review dedicated to those sources of energy. Converted from terawatt-hours to exajoules, these are the actual amounts of electricity that went into transmission lines around the world to be consumed by end users.
The third column of data calculates a hypothetical 2050 global fuel mix based on the agreed COP 28 targets. As seen in column 4 “multiple,” nuclear energy is tripled in accordance with COP 28. Also, in accordance with COP 28, use of coal, oil, and gas is eliminated. Not agreed to at COP 28, but to help reach the 1,000 exajoule target, production of geothermal and biofuel energy are both doubled. That leaves the remainder of the needed power to be provided (in this example) equally by wind and solar. It is reasonable to assume, based on everything they’re saying in Dubai and Davos, that this is the model. This is the logical realization of what they’re calling for.
These calculations yield an overwhelming reality check. Yet what assumption is incorrect? The target of 1,000 exajoules is almost certainly too low. Nuclear power is tripled, and hydropower and biofuel are both doubled. None of that is easy; in the case of biofuel, it could be an environmental catastrophe. But even if those other non-thermal sources of energy were to increase two to three times, without coal, oil, and gas, a stupefying expansion of wind and solar would be required. “Tripling” these renewables doesn’t even get us into the ballpark.
To deliver 1,000 exajoules of power to the world by 2050, for every wind turbine we have today, expect to see more than 60 of them. For every field of photovoltaics we have today, expect to see nearly 100 more of them. Is this feasible? Because from Dubai to Davos, this is what they’re claiming we’re going to do.
Confronted with these facts, even the most enthusiastic proponents of wind and solar energy may hesitate when considering the magnitude of the task. Eliminating production of fossil fuel entirely by 2050 ought to be seen, for all practical purposes, as impossible. The uptick in mining, the land consumed, the expansion of transmission lines, the necessity for a staggering quantity of electricity storage assets to balance these intermittent sources, the vulnerability of wind and solar farms to weather events including deep freezes, tornadoes, and hail, and the stupefying task of doing it all over again every 20-30 years as the wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, and storage batteries reach the end of their useful lives—all of this suggests procuring 90+ percent of global energy from wind and solar energy is a fool’s errand.
If coal, oil, and gas are phased out and it is unrealistic to expect nearly 1,000 exajoules of power to be delivered by wind and solar-generated electricity, what’s left? Part three of this series will examine the potential of the remaining energy alternatives—nuclear, hydroelectric, biofuel, geothermal—along with possible innovations that someday may change the rules.
Alternatives to Wind & Solar Energy
If the delusional but dead serious demands coming out of the international climate crisis community are to be believed, and as documented in the earlier two segments of this report, achieving universal energy security in the world will require wind energy capacity to increase by a factor of 60, while solar capacity increases by a factor of 100. The mix between wind and solar can vary, of course, but the required overall increase is indisputable. As noted in Part One of this report, that would be a very best-case scenario, where extraordinary improvements in energy efficiency meant that total energy production worldwide would only have to increase to 1,000 exajoules per year, from an estimated 600 exajoules in 2022.
Finally, and as explained in Part Two, this is preposterous. Wind and solar energy cannot possibly increase in global capacity by a multiple of 50-100 times. It is utterly infeasible. As noted, “The uptick in mining, the land consumed, the expansion of transmission lines, the necessity for a staggering quantity of electricity storage assets to balance these intermittent sources, the vulnerability of wind and solar farms to weather events including deep freezes, tornadoes, and hail, and the stupefying task of doing it all over again every 20-30 years as the wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, and storage batteries reach the end of their useful lives—all of this suggests procuring 90+ percent of global energy from wind and solar energy is a fool’s errand.”
One may nonetheless argue that other forms of energy can supplement wind and solar in order to still fulfill the climate community’s goal to completely displace oil, natural gas, and coal. But what then, and in what proportions? Here are the alternatives:
Tripling nuclear power—which was resolved at COP 28—is an ambitious goal already. Going from 440 operating reactors worldwide to more than 1,300 will be an effort fraught with risk, not merely because of the impact of fuel sourcing, processing, and waste—all of which can be managed—but because of security considerations due to the dual use of the technology. And even tripling global nuclear power still only delivers a mere 3.1 percent of the target 1,000 exajoules.
As for hydroelectric power, to even suggest it might be doubled worldwide—again only to provide 2.9 percent of the target 1,000 exajoules—is a transgression of unspeakable magnitude. There are few topics that so thoroughly ignite both apoplexy and unanimity among environmentalists as the damming of a river. Expect the Chinese and the Indians to further develop their hydroelectric capacity, along with a handful of other nations powerful enough to be both indifferent to and immune from environmentalist pressure. It is possible that hydroelectric capacity might more than double worldwide by 2050, but even if it were to quadruple to generate over 60 exajoules, that would still only represent 6 percent of the target of 1,000 exajoules.
Other solutions carry with them consequences as well that limit their scalability. As it is, biofuel plantations consume nearly 500,000 square miles worldwide. While biofuel crops can yield co-products such as animal feed, this only reduces net land use by between 10 and 40 percent. That improves the equation, but the land required for biofuel nonetheless makes the consequences of even just doubling production problematic. And like all large-scale agriculture, biofuel also requires irrigation, fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide. Claiming biofuel is “carbon neutral” is an obfuscating distraction from the fact that it is one of the highest-impact “renewables” of all. And even doubling production, as reflected on the chart, barely brings biofuel’s contribution to global energy production up to a paltry 1 percent of the 1,000 exajoule global target.
Much has been made of so-called “cellulosic ethanol,” a fitfully emerging technology that extracts ethanol from stems and branches of trees and crop residue. While this form of ethanol extraction is promising and may eventually become cost-effective, it raises an important question. How sustainable is it to remove all growth from forests and farmland year after year when, for millennia, the ashes and slash in forests and the plowed-under crops on farms would be left in place to decompose to restore soil nutrients? Cellulosic ethanol, should it become commercialized and used widely, may end up depleting and degrading arable land and forest ecosystems.
So-called “biomass” is already used to generate power and, indeed, in developing nations is still a primary source of fuel for heating and cooking. More advanced systems have been built all over the world to generate “carbon-neutral” electricity—neutral, of course, because the carbon being released in the combustion is carbon that was relatively recently sequestered from the atmosphere when the plants were growing. But sustainable use of biomass—removing it and burning it only at the rate it grows in the forest or on farms—still raises the question of whether this deprives soil of natural replenishment.
As an aside, it might make compelling sense to burn the excess biomass that has been accumulating in California’s overgrown forests, and, presumably, anywhere else where similar conditions have developed. Nearly a century of fire suppression in America, combined with the regulatory diminishment of the logging industry over the past few decades, has turned many forests into tinderboxes. But once the excess is removed and burned in biomass power plants and a balance of logging and controlled burns is restored to forest management, ongoing biomass extraction from forests to feed power plants may do more harm than good.
Hydrogen has been hyped almost as a panacea to global energy challenges. But hydrogen is not without problems that may be insurmountable. To begin with, hydrogen is not a hydrocarbon. It’s just hydrogen, which is the lightest element in the universe. It is extremely difficult to store in large quantities because, as such a light gas, it has a very low energy density per volume. Storing compressed hydrogen in usable quantities, such as onboard a vehicle, requires a vessel capable of withstanding 10,000 pounds per square inch. By contrast, natural gas, a molecule with one carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms, has an energy so much higher that it can be stored in usable quantities at only 3000 pounds per square inch. In its natural state, natural gas only has one third as much energy per volume as hydrogen.
But hydrogen burns clean! No CO2 emissions!
That’s true, but hydrogen, just like electricity, is a manufactured energy that has to be produced using some other form of energy. The politically popular scheme is to use electrolysis to extract hydrogen gas from water, then pump the hydrogen into an onboard fuel tank, where it can be converted back into electricity by putting it through a fuel cell. Without describing the technology behind electrolysis or a fuel cell, suffice to say that only about 70 percent of the electrical energy going into electrolysis comes back out in the form of hydrogen, and then only about 70 percent of the hydrogen going into a fuel cell comes out in the form of electricity to power an EV motor. And then there’s the energy necessary to pump the hydrogen into that 10,000 PSI tank—another 10 percent. Hydrogen fuel for vehicles will never achieve an energy efficiency greater than around 45 percent (70% x 70% x 90% = 44%). So much for that 80 percent target.
Hydrogen is also a corrosive gas, meaning we cannot simply repurpose our existing natural gas pipeline grid to transport hydrogen gas. Everything would have to be rebuilt. At best, hydrogen displays interesting potential, but it’s no panacea.
Can humanity eventually overcome its reliance on fossil fuel? The answer to that is certainly yes in the very long run, but an emphatic no in the next 25 years. This is why the fossil fuel industry has proposed creative ways to keep operating. Carbon sequestration schemes, for which oil companies and thermal power generators are happy to collect government subsidies to implement, involve pumping CO2 emissions into underground caverns. Carbon offset schemes, also supported by fossil fuel interests, enable companies to continue to emit CO2 if they pay for projects such as, for example, reforestation, which reputedly “sequester” an equivalent amount of carbon in the form of growing trees.
History may judge harshly the efficacy of carbon sequestration and carbon offsets, judging them as useless apart from being avenues (ok, superhighways) for corrupt redirection of billions (oops, trillions) of dollars. Facing powerful adversaries committed to the annihilation of their industries, however, can explain why fossil fuel emitters have embraced these schemes. Why commit corporate suicide when you can collect subsidies? What would be undoubtedly most productive would be to continue improving practices that scrub emissions of all pollutants apart from CO2, harvest natural gas flares which otherwise are wasted fuel, and overall continue to make the process of extracting, refining, and burning fossil fuel as clean as possible.
Someday, it is possible fossil fuel will be a fuel of the past. Fusion energy has been 20 years away from commercialization for the last 50 years and is still at least 20 years away from commercialization. But if physicists ever do succeed in confining a star in a bottle, the dream of energy that is both abundant and inexhaustible will have been realized. There are other possibilities. Synfuel that is formulated by removing CO2 from fossil fuel emissions and combining it with hydrogen gas to produce a liquid transportation fuel with a high energy density is already feasible, although nowhere near commercialization. Geothermal energy is a wild card, possibly with the potential to put a major dent in achieving the overall energy production target. On the other hand, wave energy, heralded by its proponents as a promising renewable energy solution, would probably make an even bigger mess than wind turbines without making much of a difference.
The reality today is that coal, oil, and gas provided about 500 exajoules of energy in 2022, just over 80 percent of the roughly 600 exajoules of global energy production. To achieve universal energy security in the world, global energy production must increase to 1,000 exajoules at the very least. In 2022, wind and solar energy together produced 12.4 exajoules, a pittance. The reality is simple: to reach a reasonable target for worldwide energy production, we have to develop everything. An all-of-the-above energy strategy is the only feasible approach. Anything else is delusional at best.
It would be a mistake, oblivious to the unforeseen technological breakthroughs that define human history, to not be optimistic about the world’s energy future in the long run. But over the next 25 years, fossil fuel is going to be with us, and in the near term, its use will most likely increase rather than decrease. Our challenge is to use it as responsibly and efficiently as possible, not get rid of it.
Edward Ring is a senior fellow with the California Policy Center, which he co-founded in 2013. Ring is the author of Fixing California: Abundance, Pragmatism, Optimism (2021) and The Abundance Choice: Our Fight for More Water in California (2022).